This paper provides evidence concerning political participation (turnout, awareness, attendance at meetings, campaign involvement, voting) and its relation to local governance (targeting of public services) in a developing country, based on a rural household survey in West Bengal, India. With the exception of education and immigrant status, we find that reported participation rates varied remarkably little with socio-economic status. Within villages, benefits disbursed by local governments displayed no relation to wealth, caste, education, gender or political affiliations. In contrast, allocation of benefits across villages by higherlevel governments displayed bias against poor and low caste groups; these biases were larger in villages with more unequal landownership and lower participation rates in village meetings. Political support among voters for the dominant Left party was positively correlated with receipt of recurring benefits and help provided by local governments in times of personal need, but not long-term onetime benefits or local public goods provided.
INTRODUCTION
A critical aspect of successful functioning of a democracy is its capacity to induce elected officials to be accountable to citizens. Accountability pressures depend critically on the pressures imposed on elected officials by citizens, through the way they vote, exercise voice and receive information about the actions of officials. If a large fraction of citizens either do not express their opinions, lack proper information or understanding of policy issues, a democracy would create no incentives for politicians to espouse or implement policies in the public interest. Governments can then be corrupt and captured by special interest groups, without facing any threat of displacement.
Uneven patterns of political participation across different socio-economic groups may thus be a powerful cause of perpetuation of social and economic inequalities. These hypotheses necessitate empirical research on patterns of political participation and awareness among citizens, and how these relate to accountability of governments. While a number of such studies are available for developed and middle income countries, they are scarce for low income, developing countries.
Given the contemporary interest in the relation between democracy and development, such studies are especially needed in the context of poor countries, to understand differences in functioning of democracy between countries at different stages of development.
Of particular interest is the functioning of local democracy. Many developing countries have recently embarked on experiments in decentralized development and local democracy. It has been noted by many authors that such experiments are prone to various pitfalls, most especially the possibility of elite capture of local governments. This is based on a presumption that democracy performs less well as an accountability mechanism at the local rather than the national level.
While theoretical counter-arguments to such a presumption may be provided (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000)), empirical research is required. To assess the promise of a decentralization as a strategy of economic development, one needs to assess patterns of political participation and accountability at the local level.
The connection between political participation and socio-economic characteristics has been studied using household surveys in the context of a number of countries, such as the United States (Verba and Nie (1972) , Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) , Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) , Przeworski (2006) ) , and Latin America (Gaviria, Panizza and Seddon (2002) , Baiochhi, Chaudhuri, Heller and Silva (2006) ). Przeworski (2006) provides an overview of many studies of electoral turnout across a wide cross-section of countries. A rough summary of the findings of this literature is that: (i) In general, political participation increases with measures of socioeconomic status, but the extent varies across countries; (ii) In the United States, political participation varies sharply with socio-economic status, with large and significant variations across race and income categories in voting turnout, participation in campaigns, and political awareness.
1 2 (iii) In most other countries both developed and developing for which data is available, patterns of political participation vary relatively little with socio-economic characteristics.
3
Yet with few exceptions (such as Baiochhi et al (2006) or Krishna (2006) ), these studies do not correlate participation patterns with public policies such as targeting to different socio-economic groups. Hence they do not throw much light directly on the relation between political participation of citizens and government accountability. Nor do they pertain to local governments specifically. This paper presents an empirical analysis of patterns of political participation (turnout, awareness, attendance at political and civic meetings, involvement in political campaigns, voting) in local governance across socio-economic categories in rural West Bengal, a state in Eastern India. We relate these to targeting of services administered by local governments.
We also examine ways that citizens voted for different parties in a poll we administered (with secret ballots), and how these related to benefits they received from local governments. We discuss possible implications of these results concerning the nature of accountability pressure imposed on local governments in rural West Bengal over the past quarter century.
The analysis is based on data collected from a household survey in a sample of 85 villages drawn from 15 major agricultural districts in West Bengal. This state is particularly interesting for a variety of reasons. It has a relatively long experience with local democracy spanning a quarter century, unlike other Indian states. Moreover, West Bengal is unique insofar as a coalition of Left parties has been repeatedly re-elected across six successive elections with an absolute majority, whereas other Indian states have witnessed incumbents losing elections regularly. However, the dominance of the Left in recent elections has been declining in the last two election rounds. The source of the political durability of the Left Front in West Bengal is therefore an intriguing question, as is the question of why it appears to be increasingly challenged in recent years. Has the durable political success of the Left in West Bengal resulted from its actions to relieve rural poverty via land reforms and broad-based distribution of benefits from development programs?
Or does it reflect a strategy of clientelism which favored particular narrow groups to the exclusion of many others?
Details of the surveys are described in Section 2. An important drawback of our analysis must be acknowledged at the outset: it is based on a cross-sectional analysis in which any inference of causality is slippery. The correlations, particularly at the cross-village level, should be properly viewed as descriptive facts. Nevertheless, we believe that the underlying issues are important enough that such facts and their consistency with different hypotheses should still be of considerable interest. We shall also seek to corroborate these findings with others based on longitudinal village studies (e.g., with Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) who study the same set of villages spanning 1978-98, but using different data sources). We subsequently examine how benefit delivery patterns were related to attendance and participation rates in the village gram sabha (GS) . The gram sabha is a key forum within these villages for citizens to meet at least twice a year and discuss matters pertaining to the activities of the GP. We find evidence that villages with greater GS participation were also those which delivered more benefits to the landless and SC/ST population. Education measured by highest years of schooling across all household members rose from an average of 6.6 years among the landless to 13.9 years among the biggest landowners with more than 10 acres of agricultural land. One third belonged to scheduled castes (SCs) and 3.4% to scheduled tribes (STs). The proportion of SCs is negatively correlated with landholding, but this is not evident for STs. Excepting the landless, more than two-thirds were engaged in agriculture as their primary occupation, and less than one-fifths had migrated into these villages since 1967.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND AWARENESS
The landless in contrast were predominantly engaged in non-agricultural occupations and twofifths were newcomers.
Reported registration and turnout were near universal (above 98%) for all excepting the landless (88-89%): it is likely these have been subject to some degree of over-reporting. The aggregate voter turnout rate was similar to that reported (95%) in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan by Krishna. Among the landless, more than a tenth said they were not registered or did not vote. A larger fraction (15%) among the landless and marginal landowners also reported disturbances at or near the polling booth, or declined to answer this question, compared with 6-9% among the rest. 5 Table 2 reports conditional logit regressions for registration, turnout, and disturbances We now turn to attendance in political meetings, such as rallies, election meetings called by political parties. Attendance rates were quite high, averaging 48% across the population, much higher than the corresponding attendance rate reported for Rajasthan and MP was 33% (Krishna (2006)). Attendance rates did not exhibit any marked unevenness across different land classes, lying above 40% for every land class, rising to 65% among big landowners. This is more likely to owe to higher education among the landed: the regression in the first column of Table 3 shows that attendance rates fell with landownership and rose with education levels, after controlling for other characteristics. Moreover they were higher among SC and ST households. As expected, males, non-immigrants, and those engaged in agricultural occupations were more likely to attend. Note: All three regressions also include interactions of North Bengal dummy with male, agricultural land, SC & ST only * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 3 also reports on a more active form of political participation: in political campaigns.
Approximately 26% of all households were engaged in campaigns. This is similar to the Karnataka districts studied by Crook and Manor (1998) ( where it was 23%) , but lower than the Rajasthan and MP districts studied by Krishna (2006) (where it was 43%). In our sample this proportion was distributed quite evenly across different land classes, with the lowest proportion being 23% among the landless, and the highest participation rate being 38% among the biggest landowners. The regression results in Table 3 show no association with land or occupation. It is interesting to note the SC households are significantly more involved in campaigns, corroborating accounts of the increasingly active role played by some SC groups by Ruud (1999) . A similar finding is reported for Karnataka, Rajasthan and MP by Crook and Manor (1998) , and Krishna (2006) respectively. As with all other measures of participation, males and more educated heads were significantly more likely to be involved, and immigrants less likely to be involved. Finally, a staggering 69% of households reported making financial contributions to political campaigns, with the lowest proportion being 61% among the landless, rising from 74% among marginal landowners to 93% among the biggest. The regressions show some but limited association with land owned, and a stronger association with education. Table 4 describes reported attendance and participation rates in village meetings (gram sabhas) that discuss matters relating to local government activities. One-third of all households reported attending these within the previous three years, compared with 17% in the Karnataka districts studied by Crook and Manor (1998) . Attendance rates exhibit some unevenness across land classes, rising from 33% among the landless to 44% among marginal landowners and 50% for those with between 1.25 and 2.5 acres, and falling thereafter to between 35 and 44% among those owning more land. The regressions in Table 4 show little association with land or caste status, but are correlated with education and immigrant status.
Our survey included questions about the nature of active participation in gram sabhas: whether respondents were accustomed to standing up to speak or ask questions. These participation rates rose from 6.5% among the landless, to between 14 and 19% among marginal, small and medium landowners, and 38% among big landowners. Hence there is some unevenness in active participation in the village meetings only at the extreme ends of the economic spectrum.
However, the regressions in Table 4 show the only significant predictors of active involvement in gram sabhas to be education, gender and immigrant status. For the vast majority of landowning households (i.e., excluding the top 1% of the population owning more than 10 acres of agricultural land) the likelihood of speaking in gram sabhas hardly varied. Moreover, SC/ST households were just as likely to speak up as non-SC/ST households.
We now turn to evidence concerning political awareness. Table 5 pertains to responses to questions pertaining to regularly watching (or hearing) political or economics news on TV (or radio). TV news exposure was positively associated with land status, as one might expect. The proportion rose from 31% among the landless, to 72% among big landowners. Table 5 shows it was significantly negatively associated with agricultural occupation, ST-SC status, and positively with education and male gender. With regard to radio news, the overall proportion was similar to TV( about 33%), but was much more even across socio-economic categories. Only education and gender were significantly correlated with exposure to radio news.
Next, consider principal sources of information concerning GP activities apart from the media. These are remarkably similar across different land classes, with the exception of the top 1% that owned more than 10 acres. Between 43 and 48% got information from elected GP officials, between 29 and 38% from friends, relatives or neighbors, and between 18 and 25% from political party activists. Gram sabhas and government bureaucrats did not have any significant role as information providers. The regression results shown in Table 5 indicate almost no pattern of variation with SECs, except for a slight tendency for more educated heads to rely less on informal sources (family, friends or party activists). These results imply homogenous access to information concerning GP activities across various socio-economic categories within villages.
Finally we consider awareness of development or antipoverty programs administered by GPs. On average, less than 20% in most classes were aware of these programs, which seems quite low (and probably reflects the small scale of these programs: the average proportion of households that reported receiving benefits from any single program did not exceed 4%; and only in three or four programs did reported benefit rates exceed 1%). The raw averages show some tendency for the top 1% of the population to be more aware, and the landless to be less aware, but otherwise awareness tends to vary little across land classes. The regression results in Table 6 show that 1. Also includes square of age those with less land were more likely to be aware, after controlling for education, immigrant status and gender. SC and ST heads were likely to be just as aware as anyone else, and in some cases (employment programs for STs and housing programs for SCs) were likely to be significantly more aware. Across different programs there was a tendency for awareness to vary with need and/or entitlement: landless households were more aware of loan and employment programs earmarked for the landless; marginal landowners more aware of loan and seed programs that only they would find useful. 
TARGETING PATTERNS AND GRAM SABHA ATTENDANCE
In this section we consider the distribution of benefits within and across villages, the extent to which they were targeted to poor and SC/ST groups, and how these targeting patterns varied with one form of political participation -attendance and participation in gram sabhas. Since we are relying on a one-time household survey, we can only examine cross-village regressions of targeting with political participation. Such cross-section regressions are fraught with all the customary qualifications: they do not establish causation, and may reflect the joint effect of unobserved community characteristics. These regressions merely represent one way of checking whether the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that political participation affects accountability of elected government officials. One additional value of the exercise is that data concerning allocation of benefits of various public services is often lacking, while evidence on political participation is more easily available (e.g., attendance rates in civic and political meetings). The results can inform us on the extent to which attendance rates be taken to be an indicator or proxy of how well the democratic process is functioning with regard to service delivery. Table 7 provides averages of various benefit programs (house, water, employment, minikits, IRDP, roads, relief against disasters or old-age or widow status, and ration card) that households reported receiving over the periods 1978-98 and over 1998-2005 . We report these two periods separately, as the reported benefits for the earlier period may be subject to greater recall bias. We see that the proportions reported receiving benefits of most kinds were substantially higher for the later period. We therefore use reported benefits for the 1998-2005 period subsequently in our analysis of targeting. Table 7 shows a large fraction of village households benefited from various programs during the 1998-2005 period. The largest benefits were reported for roads (32%) and water (24%). Ration card and relief programs were reported by 12%, minikits and employment by 5% and 2-3% for IRDP and housing. effects. This indicates the nature of intra-village targeting. The first column shows that those with more non-agricultural land were somewhat likely to receive more benefits. Apart from this, there was no tendency for GPs to discriminate on the basis of education, caste or agricultural land.
There was no noticeable bias against the poor, against women-headed households, or against
immigrants. In villages with higher attendance rates in the gram sabha, the bias in favor of those with more non-agricultural land was significantly less, and there was better treatment of the SC households.
The second column of Table 8A indicates the extent to which benefits received varied with how politically active the household was, and the way that the household voted. If benefits were granted in a politically partisan manner, one would expect that controlling for other relevant characteristics, the party in power would discriminate in favor of those voting for it. We also see how benefits correlated with attendance in political meetings, and participation or contribution to political campaigns. We find no significant association with the way the household voted: those voting for the opposite party were likely to be treated the same way as its own supporters. The association with political meetings and campaigns is complex: with a bias in favor of those attending meetings and against those participating in campaigns in villages with low gram sabha attendance rates. These biases are significantly smaller in villages with high gram sabha attendance rates. Table 8B Table 8A . Hence there appears to be no evidence of any partisan treatment by either Leftcontrolled or non-Left-controlled GPs. Standard errors in parentheses Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Other controls include age, occupation, male, immigrant dummy and their interactions Table 9 examines how intravillage targeting ratios (aggregating across all benefits) for the period 1998-2003 were correlated with gram sabha attendance rates across villages, besides measures of inequality in land and education (controlling for the demographic weights of the landless and SC/ST groups, and average land holdings and education in the village). A higher demographic weight of the landless indicates a higher incidence of landlessness in the village, given the average landholding in the village ---i.e., greater poverty.
6 Note that if per capita benefit received by members of a particular group do not vary with the relative size of the group, the share of this group as a whole would increase proportionally with the demographic weight of the group. If the per capita benefit accruing to the landless rises (resp. falls) with the extent of landlessness, the targeting share of the landless would be decreasing in their demographic weight. The first column
shows an insignificant association of the targeting share of the landless with their demographic weight ---suggesting that their per capita benefit was declining significantly with the extent of landlessness. Moreover, there was a significant positive interaction between GS attendance rates and the demographic weight of the landless. This suggests that the per capita benefit was significantly higher in villages with higher GS attendance rates. Otherwise, the targeting share did not co-vary with land or education inequality.
The second column provides corresponding results for the targeting share of the SC/ST group. (2006) based on an entirely different source and nature of data for the same villages covering the period 1978-98, we find a significant negative association with land inequality. 7 We also find a significant positive interaction between GS attendance rates and the demographic weights of these groups. And of the resources they obtained, they allocated a lower share to the landless. We do not see signs of any significant bias in cross-village allocations with respect to the proportion of SC/ST groups.
Consistent with the results in Bardhan and Mookherjee
The second column in Table 10A includes the share of the Left Front in local government seats during the 1998-2003 period, and the third column also adds the square of this share. There is a significant U-shaped relation with the extent of Left domination of the local government, with a turning point at around 57%. This suggests a tendency to allocate more resources to GPs where the Left Front was solidly entrenched (i.e, had a two-third majority or higher), compared with those more evenly contested. Hence there seems to be evidence of political partisanship in the inter-village allocation, in contrast to intra-village allocations. Table 10B examines how inter-village allocations were affected by GS attendance rates within those villages. If we differentiate between villages with high and low attendance rates of the poor (the second column of Table 10B), the inter-village biases become even more sharply evident.
Among villages with low attendance rates, those with more landless or SC households received significantly fewer benefits. In addition, villages with greater inequality in education were favored. These biases were substantially smaller in villages with high GS attendance rates of poor households.
Hence the results indicate that gram sabha attendance rates were positively correlated with targeting in favor of landless and SC groups. Could gram sabha participation represent one channel by which inequalities in land or social status were associated with poorer targeting?
Recall from Table 4 that attendance rates were not significantly associated with land or caste at the household level. Table 11 examines how attendance and participation rates were correlated with village characteristics (across villages). Villages with a higher incidence of landlessness and ST status exhibited lower attendance rates, irrespective of whether we control for district fixed effects. Controlling for this, land or education inequality was not significantly associated with attendance rates.
In summary, gram sabha attendance rates were correlated with measures of targeting to vulnerable sections of the population. They were also negatively correlated with landlessness and incidence of ST households. Hence gram sabha participation represented one possible channel by which inequality in land and in social status translated into lower accountability of panchayat officials to the landless and SC/ST groups.
VOTING PATTERNS
We now analyze voting patterns across different political parties in the secret ballot we administered at the end of the household survey. Each respondent was asked to select from symbols representing different parties used in elections, and cast the ballot into a sealed box.
Ballots were marked by a code number for each respondent and opened later, and recorded in data sheets. A similar procedure has been used in National Election Surveys. Table 12 presents regressions predicting whether a respondent voted for a Left Front party in our ballot, on the basis of number of reported benefits and their timing, apart from various household characteristics. Receipt of benefits is interacted with the seat share of the Left Front in the year that the benefits were received, since the `gratitude' of the voter would be likely to be directed to the party in power in the local government at that time. We separate the role of benefits received by the household in question, from those received by friends or kin, and the proportion of households in the village as a whole that received benefits. We also include help provided by the GP to the household in connection with difficulties faced by the latter in their occupation, and in times of disturbances or personal emergency. The precise year that such benefits were provided was not recorded, so these are interacted with the average Left share over the entire In order to investigate the interpretation of the preceding results as symptoms of clientelism, Table 13 separates benefits further into two different categories: one-time and recurring benefits.
Clientelism involves an implicit quid pro quo, an exchange of (recurring) favors for (recurring) political support. The latter category includes IRDP, credit, minikits, employment and relief programs, while the former includes the rest. Some programs are inherently one-time, such as land reform benefits, building of houses, toilets or installation of drinking water taps in the neighborhood. Others are ambiguous, such as road programs. We include roads in the one-time category partly because that seems the more appropriate classification, besides the fact that the one-time category includes programs of a more infrastructural, local public good nature. Besides, we ran the regressions also including roads in the recurring category and found the results largely unchanged. Table 13 shows that only the recurring benefits received from Left-dominated GPs was associated with higher support for the Left. Moreover, controlling for one's own receipt of recurring benefits, increased recurring benefits received by kin from Left-dominated GPs reduced support for the Left. These results suggest that personalized exchanges of short-term benefits played a significant role in electoral support for the Left ---those aware of benefits received by others rather than oneself from Left-dominated GPs were less inclined to vote for the Left. Moreover, the importance of recurring rather than one-time benefits suggest the importance of an implicit quid pro quo between beneficiaries and the party perceived to be dispensing the benefits. They also suggest that electoral accountability pressures would have operated more with regard to distribution of recurring rather than one-time private or local public good benefits. Table 14 examines association of Left support with other indicators of household well-being, such as whether it lived in a non-permanent (kuchha) house, and whether it reported that the food intake of the household is `insufficient for its needs'. Approximately 11% of the sample reported an insufficient food consumption. The regression also adds dummies for political awareness and participation: whether the head watches political and economic news on TV and radio, whether Table 15 explores determinants of whether a voter tended to vote consistently for the Left or its opponents across successive elections. We have seen above that almost half of the respondents were Left-secure voters, constituting a secure `vote-bank' for the Left. Columns 3 and 4 present a logit for whether a respondent was a Left-secure voter, Columns 5 and 6 for a secure-non-Left voter, and columns 1 and 2 for whether the household was a secure voter for either Left or nonLeft. There is a strong positive association of SC, ST status, and help received from GP in times of disturbance with Left-secure. Conversely, there is a strong negative association of SC/ST with non-Left-secure, and a positive association with land owned. Immigrants were less inclined to be secure voters for either party, or to be secure non-Left supporters. `Swing' voting was more likely among those with more education, land, non-SC, immigrants, and received less help from GPs.
Among village attributes relevant in predicting secure Left support, high land inequality and low education spread were negatively correlated. Hence Table 15 shows that the Left was more likely to have a secure vote-bank among poorer, lower caste, less educated sections of the population, and in villages with lower land inequality. This is consistent with explanations for stable support of the Left in terms of vulnerability and lack of education among poor, lower caste sections, and in their reliance on local governments for personal help. In villages with lower land inequality, the Left has been more successful in mobilizing these groups. Moreover, one third of West Bengal households report watching political and economic news on the TV and on radio. 40% obtain news about activities of the GPs from the GP directly, indicating a high level of personal contact.
With the exception of education, gender and immigrant status, reported participation rates vary remarkably little with socio-economic status. Weaker sections of the population, defined by land or caste status, participate at rates similar to those of the remaining population, and have access to similar information channels. There is negligible evidence of exclusion or marginalization of these sections from the local political process. 8 The importance of education in predicting political participation suggests the possible role of education policy in strengthening local democracy. Of course, this is only suggestive as it is based on cross-sectional rather than longitudinal evidence: it is equally possible that it reflects unobserved traits that correlate with both education and political participation. this seems related to the high and even rates of political participation and awareness of different socio-economic groups in the activities of the local GP and gram sabha meetings. This is encouraging news for decentralization advocates: governments at the lowest layer seemed less prone to `capture' by local socio-economic elites than were governments at upper levels.
With regard to voting patterns, we found electoral support for incumbent parties among households was related to the benefits they received from GPs dominated by the incumbent in the past. This is unlikely to reflect voter gratitude per se, because it pertained only to recurring benefits such as credit, minikits, employment or relief payments, and help received from the GP in times of personal need. One-time benefits from road, water projects or from the land reforms were not associated with electoral support. This is suggestive of personalized relationships with political parties as a source of ensuring continued political support. On the other hand, as explained above, there is no evidence that these benefits were concentrated narrowly to favor particular groups within the village, which provides evidence against clientelism as the dominant Secure support for the Left was concentrated among SC and ST groups, those with less land and education, and those relying on support from GPs in times of personal emergency. This fact can also be viewed in different ways. Supporters of the Left Front could argue that the political durability of the Left owes to the support it has provided to poor and more vulnerable sections of the rural population. Critics could interpret the same facts as implying that continued political dominance of the Left will require perpetuation of vulnerability of these groups. 9 In either case, the results indicate some causes for the increasingly contested nature of local government elections over the past decade lie in the decline in agricultural occupations, reduced economic vulnerability and rising levels of education and aspirations among the poor.
9 Even the latter statement needs to be qualified by the fact that increases in agricultural land over time in Left-dominated villages by a given household translated into a greater likelihood of voting for the Left. In contrast, cross-sectional variations of voting patterns indicate a general tendency for wealthier, better educated people to vote against the Left.
